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THE EFFECT OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON EARNING MANAGEMENT WITH THE BONUS PLAN AS A MODERATING VARIABLES

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Abstract- *The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of Good Corporate Governance (GCG) on Earnings Management moderated by a Bonus Plan. Conflicts that occur due to separation of ownership are called agency conflicts that can cause agency problems between owners and managers. This tendency makes earnings management practices more frequent by management. Where earnings management is part of creative accounting which provides opportunities for managers to act opportunistically, namely obtaining personal benefits. In an effort to protect each stakeholder's interests, good and correct corporate governance is needed or commonly referred to as good corporate governance. Design / methodology / approach - This study uses secondary data in the form of financial reports on Islamic banking in Indonesia for the period 2012-2019 The analysis used in this study is a multiple regression analysis model using hypothesis testing. Findings - There is no influence of the Sharia Supervisory Board (DPS) on earnings management, there is a significant influence of independent commissioners on earnings management, there is a significant effect of the audit committee on earnings management, there is no significant effect of the sharia supervisory board with bonus plans on earnings management, There is no significant effect of the independent commissioner with bonus plan moderated on earnings management. There is a significant effect of the audit committee with bonus plan moderated on earnings management. Practical implications - The results will increase awareness of the importance of implementing Good Corporate Governance (GCG) in Islamic Banks in Indonesia to reduce earnings management practices. Originality / value - This study wants to find out whether the bonus plan can moderate Good Corporate Governance towards Earnings Management in Islamic Banking in Indonesia.*

Keywords —.*Good Corporate Governance, Earning Management Bonus Plan*

I. INTRODUCTION

The banking industry or bank is a company engaged in the financial services sector, there are many stakeholders involved in this banking activity. In an effort to protect every stakeholder interest, good and correct corporate governance is needed or commonly referred to as good corporate governance in simple terms good corporate governance can be interpreted as a good corporate control system, the implementation of good corporate governance can be seen from the relationship mechanism between various parties who take care of banking companies.

In running the business of a company, management is not the owner of the company. This separation of ownership will cause conflicts in the control and implementation of company management which causes managers to act not in accordance with the wishes of the owners.

Conflicts that occur due to separation of ownership are called agency conflicts that can cause agency problems between owners and managers. The owner of the company gives the manager authority to manage the company such as managing funds and making other company decisions for and on behalf of the owner. This is what can cause the manager not to act in the best interest of the owner because of different interests. This happens because managers as company managers are superior in mastering information and know more about internal information and the prospects of the company in the future than owners and shareholders. This tendency makes earnings management practices more frequent by management. Where earnings management is part of creative accounting which provides opportunities for managers to act opportunistically, namely obtaining personal benefits.

The world of banking is a business company engaged in banking. Banking is also a profit-oriented company. Therefore, it is possible that banking companies will also implement earnings management practices so that the company's track record looks good. This is confirmed by the results of research conducted by Yana (2014), namely that there are several banks that practice earnings management. This study took a sample of Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia.

The fundamental problem is the practice of earnings management in Indonesia, especially in the world of Islamic banking in Indonesia. This fundamental issue relates to the existence of objective information on banking financial reporting. In financial reporting, there are actions to manipulate profits to achieve certain goals. Therefore, the financial statements are not objective because what actually happened is different from what was written in the financial statements. For this reason, this study will also reveal the facts that occur in the banking world regarding earnings management.

The problem of manipulating these financial reports can make customers, investors and potential investors suffer losses. Therefore, in order for users of financial statements to fulfill their rights to obtain an objective financial report, this issue must be discussed.

Earning management has always been a topic that is no longer taboo to discuss. (Heally & Wallen, 1999) states that earnings management occurs when managers use judgments in financial reports and preparation of transactions to change financial reports, thereby misleading stakeholders about the company's economic performance or to influence contract-related outcomes that depend on accounting numbers. The statement explains that earnings management is a process of management interference in the external financial reporting process for the benefit of oneself (the company). Earnings management is an intervention by management in the process of preparing financial reports for external parties so that it can eve, increase and decrease earnings reporting, where management can use the leeway in the use of accounting methods, make policies (discreationary) that can speed up or delay costs and revenue, so that the company's profit is smaller or greater as expected.

Earnings management actions of course have passed generally accepted accounting principles in financial reporting. The impact of this earnings management is that providing financial information becomes less relevant and the way it seems 'cunning' even though it is allowed. (Rokhlinasari, 2015) Earnings management can be understood in the framework of an agency relationship perspective. In this case, agency theory basically regulates the relationship between a group of employers (principals) and a task recipient (agent). As an agent, the manager is morally responsible for optimizing the profits of the owners (principal) and in return will be compensated according to the contract. If in a resource management company is carried out optimally, a good report will be created and can emphasize the earnings management actions taken, therefore it requires handling by competent management, such as managing Good Corporate Governance or a good corporate governance. (Pamudji & Trihartati, 2010) One component that plays an important role in the process of implementing Good Corporate Governance or good governance is the audit committee.

II. METHOD

The data analysis technique used to solve the problem in this research is quantitative analysis, namely: Multiple linear regression analysis is used to determine the effect of two independent variables on one dependent variable. Where Y is the dependent variable and X is the independent variable. The coefficient a is a constant (intercept) which is the intersection point between the regression line and the Y axis at the Cartesian coordinates.

The research design used in this research is a quantitative research method with the type of causality, which aims to explain the role of the Bonus Plan as moderator, the Sharia Supervisory Board, the Proportion of the Independent Commissioner, and the Audit Committee. This study tests the hypothesis by analyzing the effect of independent variables, namely the effect of good corporate governance on bonus plans as a moderating variable, on the dependent variable, namely earnings management and in addition, this study also uses control variables, namely company size, tax planning and profitability in banking. sharia for the period 2012-2019.

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Normality test

Picture 1
Jarque-Bera Normality Test



Based on the results of the output above, that the probability value is 0.870444. Because the probability value (0.000024) <0.05, it can be concluded that the residuals are not normally distributed.

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Multicollinearity Test

Multicollinearity is something in which some or all of the independent variables are highly correlated. With the help of the Eviews software, the following results are obtained:

Table 1
Multicollinearity Test

Variance Inflation Factors
Date: 11/18/20 Time: 15:41
Sample: 1 112
Included observations: 112

Variable	Coefficient Variance	Uncentered VIF	Centered VIF
C	2.270322	140.2666	NA
DPS	0.042014	17.13070	1.408384
KI	0.100316	2.138841	1.120085
KA	0.139151	14.86330	1.577392
SIZE	0.010031	152.2413	1.139027
PROFIT	0.004656	6.055239	1.186035
TAX	0.244701	2.564247	1.086235

From the output above, it can be seen that the VIF value is less than 10, so it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity in the data.

Autocorrelation Test

The autocorrelation test is used to determine whether or not there is a deviation from the classic autocorrelation assumption, namely the correlation between the residuals in one observation and other observations in the regression model. The autocorrelation test is carried out using the Durbin Watson statistical test, namely by comparing the calculated Durbin-Watson number (DW) with its critical value (dL and dU).

Conclusion criteria:

- If DW <dL or DW> 4 - dL, there is autocorrelation.
- If dU <DW <4 - dU, then there is no autocorrelation.
- If dL $\leq$ DW $\leq$ dU or 4 - dU $\leq$ DW $\leq$ 4 - dL, the Durbin Watson test does not produce an inconclusive conclusion.

With a sample size of n = 112, □ = 0.05 and the number of independent variables k = 7, the critical value is dL = 1.5616 and dU = 1.8263.

The results of the autocorrelation test are presented in the following table:

Table 2
Autocorrelation Test Results

R-squared	0.454115	Mean dependent var	6.23E-15
Adjusted R-squared	0.411717	S.D. dependent var	1.309510
S.E. of regression	1.004389	Akaike info criterion	2.923581
Sum squared resid	103.9062	Schwarz criterion	3.142032
Log likelihood	-154.7205	Hannan-Quinn criter.	3.012213
F-statistic	10.71057	Durbin-Watson stat	1.931568
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

Based on the table above, the Durbin-Watson value is 1.9315. Because the DW value is between dU (1.8263) <DW (1.9315) <4 - dU (2.1727), it means that there is no autocorrelation.

Heteroscedasticity Test

The heteroscedasticity test aims to test whether in the regression model there is an inequality of variance from the residuals of one observation to another. If the residual variance from one observation to

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another is constant, it is called homoscedasticity. With the help of Eviews software, the following results are obtained:

Table 3
Heteroscedasticity Test

Heteroskedasticity Test: White

F-statistic	0.767282	Prob. F(27,84)	0.7791
Obs*R-squared	22.15753	Prob. Chi-Square(27)	0.7293
Scaled explained SS	28.45414	Prob. Chi-Square(27)	0.3879

Based on the output table above, it appears that the probability value obs * R-Square> 0.05, it can be concluded that there is no violation of the heteroscedasticity assumption.

Regression Analysis Model I
To see the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, regression analysis is used with the following equation:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1DPS + b_2KI + b_3KA+\ldots\ldots+\varepsilon$$

Information:
Y = Earnings Management
X1 = Sharia Supervisory Board
X2 = Independent Commissioner
X3 = Audit Committee
X4- X6 = Control variables (Size, Profit and Tax)
b0 = Constant
b1 to b3 = the regression coefficient of each independent variable
ε = Error term
The results of Eviews 9.0 software processing for regression analysis are presented in the following table:

Table 4
Regression Analysis Model 1

Dependent Variable: ML
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 11/17/20 Time: 22:07
Sample: 2012 2019
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 14
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 101

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-4.94E+11	5.14E+11	-0.960971	0.3390
DPS	1.56E+09	1.30E+10	0.119714	0.9050
KI	-1.79E+11	4.82E+10	-3.716464	0.0003
KA	1.61E+11	5.83E+10	2.766323	0.0068
SIZE	59238.58	4899.073	12.09179	0.0000
PROFIT	3.86E+09	1.42E+11	0.027123	0.9784
TAX	5.29E+10	4.88E+11	0.108430	0.9139

Based on the table above, the panel data regression model equation can be formulated which explains the regression coefficient value on the independent variables illustrating that if the independent variable is estimated to increase by one unit and the value of the other independent variables is estimated to be constant or equal to zero, then the value of the dependent variable is estimated to increase. or it can decrease according to the sign of the independent variable regression coefficient. From the panel data regression equation above, the constant value in model one is -4.94E + 11, which means that if the

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dependent variable (Y) is not influenced by the independent variable (X) then the average magnitude of the dependent variable (Y) will be -4.94E + 11.

The regression coefficients for the independent variables in model 1 for the sharia supervisory board and audit committee are positive, indicating a unidirectional relationship between the sharia supervisory board and audit committee with earnings management, meaning that each increase in the sharia supervisory board and audit committee by one unit will cause an increase. earnings management according to the coefficient value on each variable.

The regression coefficient for the independent variable in model 1 for independent commissioners is negative, indicating that there is a non-unidirectional relationship between independent commissioners and earnings management, meaning that each increase in independent commissioners by one unit will cause a decrease in earnings management in accordance with the value of the coefficient on each variable. .

The regression coefficient for the control variables in model 1 for size, profit and tax is positive, indicating that there is a direct relationship between size, profit and tax and earnings management, meaning that one unit increase in size, profit and tax will lead to an increase in earnings management accordingly. with the coefficient value on each variable.

Partial Hypothesis Testing (t test)

To determine whether or not the influence of the independent variables is partially significant on a dependent variable, the t test is used.

Hypothesis:

• H0: B1 = 0 The Sharia Supervisory Board has no effect on Earning Management
H1: B1 ≠ 0 The Sharia Supervisory Board has an effect on earning management.
• H0: B2 = 0 Independent Commissioners have no effect on Earning Management
H2: B2 ≠ 0 Independent Commissioners have an effect on Earning Management
• H0: B3 = 0 The Audit Committee has no effect on Earning Management
H3: B3 ≠ 0 The audit committee has an effect on earnings management
• H0: B4 = 0 Size has no effect on Earning Management
H4: B4 ≠ 0 Size affects earnings management
• H0: B5 = 0 Profit has no effect on Earning Management
H5: B5 ≠ 0 Profit affects earnings management
• H0: B6 = 0 Tax has no effect on earning management
H6: B6 ≠ 0 Tax has an effect on earning management

α = 5%

Test Statistics:

$$t_{stat} = \frac{b}{Se(b)}$$, degrees of freedom = n-k-1

Information :
b: The regression beta coefficient
Se (b): Standard error regression

Test Criteria: 1. Accept H0 if $-$t table $\leq$ t stat $\leq$ t table
2. Reject H0 if -t stat <-t table or t stat> t table

With a sample test of 112 data, it is obtained t table of 1.983, t test results based on processing Eviews 9.0 are presented in the following table

Table 5
Partial Hypothesis Testing (t test)

Dependent Variable: ML
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 11/17/20 Time: 22:07
Sample: 2012 2019
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 14
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 101

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	-4.94E+11	5.14E+11	-0.960971	0.3390

DPS	1.56E+09	1.30E+10	0.119714	0.9050
KI	-1.79E+11	4.82E+10	-3.716464	0.0003
KA	1.61E+11	5.83E+10	2.766323	0.0068
SIZE	59238.58	4899.073	12.09179	0.0000
PROFIT	3.86E+09	1.42E+11	0.027123	0.9784
TAX	5.29E+10	4.88E+11	0.108430	0.9139

Based on the table above, the following results are obtained:

The variable X1 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (0.119714) <t table (1.983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of the sharia supervisory board on earnings management.

The variable X2 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (-3.716464) <t table (-1,983), then Ho is rejected. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is a significant effect of independent commissioners on earnings management.

The variable X3 has a calculated t value greater than the t table value. Because the value of t count (2.766323)> t table (1.983), then Ho is rejected. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is a significant effect of the audit committee on earnings management

The variable X4 has a calculated t value greater than the t table value. Because the value of t count (12.09179)> t table (1.983), then Ho is rejected. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is a significant effect of size on earnings management.

The variable X5 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (0.027123) <t table (1.983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of profitability on earnings management.

The variable X6 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (0.108430) <t table (1.983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of tax planning on earnings management.

Simultaneous Hypothesis Testing (Test F)

To determine whether or not there is a significant influence of the independent variables on a dependent variable, the F test or simultaneous testing is used. In other words, will the independent variables together be able to significantly influence the dependent variable.

Hypothesis:

H0: The independent variable (X) together does not have a significant effect on the dependent variable (Y).

H1: The independent variable (X) together has a significant effect on the dependent variable (Y).

$\alpha = 5\%$ (95% confidence level)

The results of the F test based on Eviews 9.0 processing are presented in the following table:

Table 6
Simultaneous Hypothesis Testing (Test F)

R-squared	0.647865	Mean dependent var	8.61E+11
Adjusted R-squared	0.625389	S.D. dependent var	1.22E+12
S.E. of regression	7.46E+11	Akaike info criterion	57.58045
Sum squared resid	5.23E+25	Schwarz criterion	57.76169
Log likelihood	-2900.813	Hannan-Quinn criter.	57.65382
F-statistic	28.82389	Durbin-Watson stat	0.893214
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

From the table above, the value for Prob is obtained. F count 0.00000. Because the value for Prob. F count 0.00000 <0.05, then H0 is rejected. Thus it can be concluded that simultaneously there is a significant influence from the sharia supervisory board, independent commissioners, audit committee, size, profit and tax planning on earnings management.

Analysis of the Coefficient of Determination (R2)

To determine the magnitude of the influence of the independent variables on the dependent, the coefficient of determination is used. If the simultaneous test is used to test the overall hypothesis, the coefficient of determination is used to calculate the magnitude of the influence of the independent variables. the magnitude of this influence ranges from the interval 0 to 1 or 0% to 100%. The table below shows the results of the calculation of the coefficient of determination

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Table 7
Analysis of the coefficient of determination

R-squared	0.647865	Mean dependent var	8.61E+11
Adjusted R-squared	0.625389	S.D. dependent var	1.22E+12
S.E. of regression	7.46E+11	Akaike info criterion	57.58045
Sum squared resid	5.23E+25	Schwarz criterion	57.76169
Log likelihood	-2900.813	Hannan-Quinn criter.	57.65382
F-statistic	28.82389	Durbin-Watson stat	0.893214
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

Based on the results of the Eviews 9.0 output above, the R-squared value is 0.648. This shows that the contribution of the sharia supervisory board, independent commissioner, audit committee, size, profit and tax to earnings management is 64.8% while the remaining 35.2% is the contribution of other variables besides the independent variables studied.

Data Model 2 Regression Analysis

To see the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable, regression analysis is used with the following equation:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + \ldots\ldots + \varepsilon$$

Y = Earnings Management
Z = Bonus Plan
X1 = Sharia Supervisory Board
X2 = Independent Commissioner
X3 = Audit Committee
X4- X6 = Control variables (Size, Profit and Tax)
b0 = Constant
b1 to b3 = the regression coefficient of each independent variable
ε = Error term
The results of Eviews 9.0 software processing for regression analysis are presented in the following table:

Table 8
Regression Analysis Model 2

Dependent Variable: ML
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 11/17/20 Time: 22:10
Sample: 2012 2019
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 14
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 101

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	1.19E+11	5.60E+11	0.213511	0.8314
DPS	-2.04E+10	1.70E+10	-1.201416	0.2327
KI	-1.84E+11	4.80E+10	-3.827439	0.0002
KA	9.88E+10	6.30E+10	1.567210	0.1206
BP	-4.322164	2.087122	-2.070872	0.0412
DPSBP	0.098448	0.051897	1.896991	0.0610
KIBP	0.750975	1.944691	0.386167	0.7003
KABP	0.524287	0.250388	2.093903	0.0391

SIZE	56781.36	5210.250	10.89801	0.0000
PROFIT	-4.38E+10	1.41E+11	-0.310360	0.7570
TAX	5.25E+10	4.82E+11	0.108890	0.9135

Based on the table above, the panel data regression model equation can be formulated which explains the regression coefficient value on the independent variables illustrating that if the independent variable is estimated to increase by one unit and the value of the other independent variables is estimated to be constant or equal to zero, then the value of the dependent variable is estimated to increase. or it can decrease according to the sign of the independent variable regression coefficient. From the panel data regression equation above, the constant value in model one is 1.19E + 11, which means that if the dependent variable (Y) is not influenced by the independent variable (X), the average size of the dependent variable (Y) will be 1.19E + 11.

The regression coefficients for the independent variables in model 2 for the sharia supervisory board, independent commissioners, bonus plans (moderating variables) and profit (control variables) are negative, indicating that there is an unidirectional relationship between the sharia supervisory board, independent commissioners, bonus plans (moderating variables). and profit (control variable) with earnings management, which means for each increase in the sharia supervisory board, independent commissioner, bonus plan (moderating variable) and profit (control variable) by one unit will cause a decrease in earnings management in accordance with the coefficient value of each. variable.

The regression coefficients for the independent variables in model 2 for the audit committee, the sharia board of commissioners with a bonus plan moderated, the independent commissioners with bonus plan moderated and the audit committee with a bonus plan moderated are positive, indicating that there is a unidirectional relationship between the sharia board of commissioners with bonus plan moderated an independent commissioned bonus plan and an audit committee moderated by a bonus plan with earnings management, which means that for each increase in the sharia board of commissioners that is moderated by a bonus plan, independent commissioners with a bonus plan moderated and an audit committee that is moderated by a bonus plan of one unit will cause a decline in earnings management. in accordance with the value of the coefficient on each variable.

The regression coefficient for the control variable in model 2 for size and tax is positive, indicating that there is a unidirectional relationship between size and tax and earnings management, meaning that each increase in size and tax by one unit will lead to an increase in earnings management in accordance with the coefficient value in each. each variable.

Partial Hypothesis Testing (t test)

To determine whether or not the influence of the independent variables is partially significant on a dependent variable, the t test is used.

Hypothesis:

• H0: B1 = 0 The Sharia Supervisory Board has no effect on Earning Management
H1: B1 ≠ 0 The Sharia Supervisory Board has an effect on earning management.
• H0: B2 = 0 Independent Commissioners have no effect on Earning Management
H2: B2 ≠ 0 Independent Commissioners have an effect on Earning Management
• H0: B3 = 0 The Audit Committee has no effect on Earning Management
H3: B3 ≠ 0 The audit committee has an effect on earnings management
• H0: B4 = 0 Bonus Plan has no effect on Earning Management
H4: B4 ≠ 0 The bonus plan has an effect on earning management
• H0: B5 = 0 DPS with bonus plan moderated has no effect on Earning Management
H5: B5 ≠ 0 DPS moderated by bonus plan has an effect on earning management
• H0: B6 = 0 KI with bonus plan moderated has no effect on Earning Management
H6: B6 ≠ 0 KI as moderate as bonus plan has an effect on earning management
• H0: B7 = 0 KA with moderation bonus plan has no effect on Earning Management
H7: B7 ≠ 0 KA as moderated bonus plan has an effect on earnings management
• H0: B8 = 0 Size has no effect on Earning Management
H8: B8 ≠ 0 Size affects earnings management
• H0: B9 = 0 Profit has no effect on Earning Management
H9: B9 ≠ 0 Profit affects earnings management
• H0: B10 = 0 Tax has no effect on earning management

H10: B10 $\neq$ 0 Tax has an effect on earning management
α = 5%
Test Statistics:

$$t_{stat} = \frac{b}{Se(b)}$$, degrees of freedom = n-k-1

tstat =, degrees of freedom = n-k-1
Information :
b: The regression beta coefficient
Se (b): Standard error regression
Test Criteria: 1. Accept H0 if $-$t table $\leqslant$ t stat $\leqslant$ t table
2. Reject H0 if -t stat <-t table or t stat> t table

With a sample test of 112 data, it is obtained t table of 1.984, t test results based on processing Eviews 9.0 are presented in the following table:

Table 9
Partial Hypothesis Testing (t test)

Dependent Variable: ML
Method: Panel Least Squares
Date: 11/17/20 Time: 22:10
Sample: 2012 2019
Periods included: 8
Cross-sections included: 14
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 101

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	t-Statistic	Prob.
C	1.19E+11	5.60E+11	0.213511	0.8314
DPS	-2.04E+10	1.70E+10	-1.201416	0.2327
KI	-1.84E+11	4.80E+10	-3.827439	0.0002
KA	9.88E+10	6.30E+10	1.567210	0.1206
BP	-4.322164	2.087122	-2.070872	0.0412
DPSBP	0.098448	0.051897	1.896991	0.0610
KIBP	0.750975	1.944691	0.386167	0.7003
KABP	0.524287	0.250388	2.093903	0.0391
SIZE	56781.36	5210.250	10.89801	0.0000
PROFIT	-4.38E+10	1.41E+11	-0.310360	0.7570
TAX	5.25E+10	4.82E+11	0.108890	0.9135

Based on the table above, the following results are obtained:

The variable X1 has a calculated t value greater than the t table value. Because the value of t count (-1.201416)> t table (-1,983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of the sharia supervisory board on earnings management.

The variable X2 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (-3.827439) <t table (-1,983), then Ho is rejected. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is a significant effect of independent commissioners on earnings management.

The variable X3 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (1.567210) <t table (1.983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of the audit committee on earnings management.

The variable X4 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (-2.070872) <t table (1.983), then Ho is rejected. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is a significant effect of the bonus plan on earnings management.

The variable X5 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (1.896991) <t table (1.983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of the bonus plan moderated sharia supervisory board on earnings management.

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The variable X6 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (0.386167) <t table (1.983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore, it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of independent commissioners with bonus plan moderation on earnings management.

The variable X7 has a calculated t value greater than the t table value. Because the value of t count (2.093903)> t table (1.983), then Ho is rejected. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is a significant effect of the audit committee with bonus plan moderated on earnings management.

The variable X8 has a calculated t value greater than the t table value. Because the value of t count (10.89801)> t table (1.983), then Ho is rejected. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is a significant effect of size on earnings management.

The variable X9 has a calculated t value greater than the t table value. Because the value of t count (-0.310360) <t table (-1,983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of profit on earnings management.

The variable X10 has a calculated t value smaller than the t table value. Because the value of t count (0.108890) <t table (1.983), then Ho is accepted. Therefore it can be concluded that partially there is no significant effect of tax on earnings management.

Simultaneous Hypothesis Testing (Test F)

To determine whether or not there is a significant influence of the independent variables on a dependent variable, the F test or simultaneous testing is used. In other words, will the independent variables together be able to significantly influence the dependent variable.

Hypothesis:

H0: The independent variable (X) together does not have a significant effect on the dependent variable (Y).

H1: The independent variable (X) together has a significant effect on the dependent variable (Y).

$\alpha = 5\%$ (95% confidence level)

The results of the F test based on Eviews 9.0 processing are presented in the following table:

Table 10

Simultaneous Hypothesis Testing (Test F)

R-squared	0.673968	Mean dependent var	8.61E+11
Adjusted R-squared	0.637742	S.D. dependent var	1.22E+12
S.E. of regression	7.34E+11	Akaike info criterion	57.58264
Sum squared resid	4.84E+25	Schwarz criterion	57.86745
Log likelihood	-2896.923	Hannan-Quinn criter.	57.69794
F-statistic	18.60466	Durbin-Watson stat	1.063575
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

From the table above, the value for Prob is obtained. F count 0.00000. Because the value for Prob. F count 0.00000 <0.05, then H0 is rejected. Thus it can be concluded that simultaneously there is a significant influence from the sharia supervisory board, independent commissioner, audit committee, bonus plan, sharia supervisory board moderated by bonus plan, independent commissioner with bonus plan moderated, audit committee moderated bonus plan, size, profit. and tax on earnings management

Analysis of the Coefficient of Determination (R2)

To determine the magnitude of the influence of the independent variables on the dependent, the coefficient of determination is used. If the simultaneous test is used to test the overall hypothesis, the coefficient of determination is used to calculate the magnitude of the influence of the independent variables. the magnitude of this influence ranges from the interval 0 to 1 or 0% to 100%. The table below shows the results of the calculation of the coefficient of determination.

Table 11

Analysis of the coefficient of determination

R-squared	0.673968	Mean dependent var	8.61E+11
Adjusted R-squared	0.637742	S.D. dependent var	1.22E+12
S.E. of regression	7.34E+11	Akaike info criterion	57.58264
Sum squared resid	4.84E+25	Schwarz criterion	57.86745
Log likelihood	-2896.923	Hannan-Quinn criter.	57.69794
F-statistic	18.60466	Durbin-Watson stat	1.063575
Prob(F-statistic)	0.000000		

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Based on the results of the Eviews 9.0 output above, the R-squared value is 0.674. This shows that the contribution of the sharia supervisory board, independent commissioner, audit committee, bonus plan, sharia supervisory board with bonus plan moderated, independent commissioner moderated by bonus plan, audit committee moderated by bonus plan, size, profit and tax to earnings management is 67, 4% while the remaining 32.6% is the contribution of variables other than the independent variables studied.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the results of research that has been carried out through the stages of collecting, managing and analyzing data regarding the Effect of Environmental Management Accounting, Environmental Strategy on Environmental Performance and Financial Performance Moderated by Managerial Commitment, it can be concluded that the results of this study are

There is no significant influence from the sharia supervisory board on earnings management.

There is a significant effect of independent commissioners on earnings management

There is a significant influence from the audit committee on earnings management

There is no significant effect of the sharia supervisory board which is moderated by bonus plans on earnings management.

There is no significant effect of the independent commissioners which is moderated by the bonus plan on earnings management.

There is a significant influence from the audit committee which is moderated by the bonus plan on earnings management.

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